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ABSTRACT Since 1991, policies of economic liberalization in Ethiopia have been effective in releasing the 
economy from rigid state control. At the same time, they have also exposed Ethiopian people to domestic and 
international free market competition. In African countries, the retreat of governments from rural development 
due to economic liberalization policies has led to the re-evaluation of the role of cooperatives. Since 1999, in 
Ethiopia, several coffee farmers cooperative unions have been established to support peasants who are 
handicapped by their lack of negotiating power in the global economy. Coffee cooperatives have become 
market-oriented and are now relatively democratic compared to the former Marxist cooperatives of the 
previous regime. Thus far, these coffee cooperatives have provided higher profits to coffee farmers than have 
private traders. The actual volume of purchase, however, is limited due to financial constraints. Because of 
this, the majority of cooperatives continues to rely on conventional marketing channels rather than on unions. 
Considering their weak financial condition, it is too early to judge the sustainability of the cooperatives 
because international prices have been high recently, and it is not yet clear how they would survive a 
downward international price trend. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Evaluations of Africa’s rural cooperative activities, particularly those under socialist systems, 
have, in general, been negative (Braverman et al., 1991; Eicher & Baker, 1982; Tsujimura, 1999). 
The main causes of problems were attributed to excessive governmental intervention, as well as too 
much dependence on communal traditions of cooperation (Tsujimura, 1999: 81). Despite past 
failures, the role of cooperatives has been reevaluated due to the retreat of governments from 
programs of rural development under economic liberalization policies (Braverman et al., 1991; 
Dorsey & Tesfaye, 2005; Kherallas et al., 2002: 166). This certainly describes the situation in 
Ethiopia. Since the late 1990s, cooperative activities have been encouraged again, despite bitter 
experiences during the socialist regime. 
 
To provide some background, in Ethiopia, economic liberalization policies were first 
implemented in 1991 when the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came 
to power(1). These policies have been effective in releasing the economy from rigid state control, but 
also mean that Ethiopian people have become exposed to the hazards of both domestic and 
international free market competition. Coffee farmers were particularly exposed to the international 
economy, in com parison with domestic staple food farmers. 
They suffer from export price fluctuations determined by the New York Stock Exchange which is 
out of their control. Coffee, which accounts for half of the value of Ethiopian exports(2), is a typical 
global commodity because it is usually produced in developing countries and consumed in 
developed countries. Therefore, marketing channels extend beyond borders, and the price of coffee 
is basically determined at international exchange markets in New York and London(3). Ethiopian 
coffee, accounting for only 4% of the world’s export amount, has almost no influence over 
international prices (ICO: Online c). After the retreat of the state from the control of marketing cof-
fee, Ethiopian farmers have been confronted by the uncontrollable international price fluctuations. 
Although state control had depressed the farm gate price of coffee to exploit profits for the national 
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income, it had nonetheless maintained low and stable farm gate prices (Befekadu & Tesfaye, 1990). 
 Cooperative activities could play an effective role in supporting coffee farmers by supplying the 
price information, capital, and transportation that small-scale farmers often lack. In addition, a 
cooperative as a representative of coffee farmers can be a stronger negotiator than an individual 
farmer in the international market. In 1999, the first coffee cooperative union, the Oromiya Coffee 
Farmers Cooperative Union (OCFCU), was established, uniting primary cooperatives in the 
Oromiya Region. The Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Unions (YCFCU), examined here, 
is the third coffee union and was established in 2002. As a unique feature of these coffee 
cooperatives, the cooperatives participate in the Fairtrade system, offering premium prices to 
producers, through farmers’ organizations, that is, cooperatives in Ethiopia, not via private traders(4). 
 Here, this paper analyzes the effects of the activities of cooperatives and unions 
on Ethiopian coffee farmers and consists of three sections. In the first section, the background of 
the study was explained, including the history of cooperatives in Ethiopia and the Fairtrade system. 
In the second section, the activities of the Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union and its 
primary cooperatives were examined. In the third section, the effects of the YCFCU on coffee 
farmers in the Gedeo Zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) 
are analyzed. Data are from interviews conducted in July 2006. 
 
BACKGROUND: COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AND COFFEE IN ETHIOPIA  
 
I. History 
 
The first cooperative organizations were established in Ethiopia in the 1950s (Couture et al., 
2002: 41). The cooperatives were active during the Derg Regime from 1974 to 1991(5) (Dorsey & 
Tesfaye, 2005: 7). The activities of cooperatives during the Derg regime were completely different 
from those of Western-type cooperatives because they were based on Marxist principles. The 
government claimed that the objective of cooperatives was “to bring an end to capitalist 
exploitation, and to prevent the re-emergence of capitalism in agriculture” (Dessalegn, 1990: 102). 
There were two types of cooperatives in rural areas: producers’ cooperatives (PCs) and service 
cooperatives (SCs). Whereas the membership rate of PCs was low, hovering around 20% from 
1988 to 1989, that of SCs was high, at 80%, based on figures from peasant associations (PAs; Table 
1). PAs were the lowest administrative structure, and membership was obligatory for farmers 
(Dessalegn, 1994a: 248–249). Although PCs benefited members by providing preferential treatment, 
which had been largely unavailable to smallholders, the productivity of PCs was one-third lower 
than that of private farmers (Dessalegn, 1994b: 289). SCs were marketing and purchasing 
cooperatives that handled modern inputs, credit, milling services, selling of consumer goods, and 
purchasing of peasants’ produce. Whereas peasants welcomed the services provided by SCs, most 
of these organizations suffered from budgetary deficits and poor financial management (Dessalegn, 
1994a: 252–254; Fantu, 1990: 70). 
  Cooperative activities under the Derg regime were halted in 1990. When the new mixed 
economic policy permitted peasants to choose whether they would work for cooperatives or 
individually, most peasants decided to reallocate cooperative lands to individual holdings 
(Dessalegn 1994a: 262; Gezachew, 1994: 220–221; Tessema, 1994: 211). After the collapse of the 
Derg regime in 1991, during the confusion of the transitional period, some SCs were looted and 
vandalized by local people for their assets (Dessalegn, 1994a), whereas others scaled down their 
activities due to severe competition with private traders after trade liberalization (Kodama, 2003)(6). 
In 1998, the activities of farmers’ cooperatives were formally revitalized by the Cooperative 
Societies Proclamation No. 147/1998(7). The Proclamation defines cooperatives as organizations 
“formed by individuals on voluntary basis,” and states that they “participate in the free market 
economic system.” This indicates the different nature of the new cooperatives from the system of 
the previous regime. 
Proclamation No. 147/1998 outlines the layered organizational structure of the cooperatives(8), 
which was not permitted by the previous regime. An organization can have four layers, i.e., primary 
cooperatives, unions, federations, and cooperative leagues, although only primary and union levels 
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have been formed to date (Dorsey & Tesfaye, 2005: 9, 20). Another unique feature of the 
proclamation is that it defines the ratio of dividends between a cooperative organization and its 
members. Article 33 of No. 147/1998 regulates that the cooperative “society shall deduct 30% of 
the net profit” and “the remaining net profit shall be divided among members.” Therefore, the 
unions provide 70% of their net profit to the primary cooperatives and the primary cooperatives in 
turn provide 70% of their net profit, including the dividends from the union, to cooperative 
members (Dorsey & Tesfaye, 2005: 29–30). 
 
II. Farmers Coffee Cooperative Unions 
 
Six coffee farmers cooperative unions were established following the issue of Proclamation No. 
147/1998 (Table 2)(9). Unions were new institutions that organized the primary cooperatives. As 
background to their establishment, after 1998, the decline of international coffee prices caused a 
great deal of business trouble between traders and cooperatives. Exporters who offered higher 
prices at coffee auction centers swindled coffee out of cooperatives without paying(10). The Ethiopian 
government took the initiative to establish Coffee Farmers Cooperative Unions to manage coffee 
export business on behalf of primary coffee cooperatives that lacked human resources and logistical 
capacity(11). 
 At the first stage of establishing coffee unions, the Ethiopian government recruited 
ex-government officials who were experienced in cooperative activities and the coffee business and 
supported their salaries in the first two years after their establishment. The strong involvement of 
the state was criticized from the viewpoint of Western concepts of cooperatives and civil society 
(Dessalegn, 2002), but considering the lack of human resources, there appeared to be no choice 
other than state-made cooperatives. 
Coffee unions are privileged to skip coffee auctions in which private traders 
are obliged to participate (see Photo 4-5 & 4-6). The typical marketing channel of the coffee 
cooperatives and unions is very simple (Fig. 1). The payment system of coffee cooperatives and 
unions is as follows: 
1. A cooperative purchases coffee from farmers at the market price. The price is determined based 
on competition between cooperatives and private traders. The payment by the cooperative is 
made immediately or around one week after the farmers deliver the coffee. The timing of the 
payment depends on the financial  status of the cooperative. 
2. The coffee purchased by the cooperative is delivered to a union. The union purchases coffee 
from cooperatives at a price equivalent to the domestic auction price at that time. The payment is 
usually made immediately or after a couple of weeks following coffee delivery; the exact 
payment time depends on the financial status of the union. In some cases, the union might 
suggest that cooperatives sell their coffee to auctions instead of to unions due to reasons 
described below(12). 
3. Unions export coffee through a Fairtrade route or conventional route. 
4. After completing the audit of unions’ finances, the amount of the dividends to be paid out to the 
cooperatives is decided. The dividends are calculated after deducting 30% of the net profit for 
the unions. 
5. Whereas 30% of the net profit, including the dividends from the union, is reserved for the 
primary cooperatives, the remaining 70% is distributed as dividends to farmers after auditing 
procedures are complete. The mode of dividend distribution is based on the volume of coffee and 
the size of the share purchased by farmers(13). The exact mode of distribution (e.g., the ratio 
between volume contribution and share amount) is left to the general assembly of the cooperative 
to decide (Proclamation No. 402/2004)(14).  
In reality, unions often advise cooperatives to sell their coffee through auctions, rather than to the 
unions. The reasons for this are: (1) the coffee volume has exceeded the amount the unions are able 
to sell; (2) the quality of the coffee does not meet the unions’ standards; and (3) the auction price is 
higher than the unions’ price(15). 
The financial constraints of primary cooperatives also limit the amount they purchase. As the 
next section shows, although farmers tend to be satisfied with the price offered by the cooperatives 
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and are willing to sell more to them, cooperatives cannot buy all the volume farmers produce. 
Farmers sell the remaining volume to private traders. 
 
III. Cooperatives and Fairtrade 
 
1. Fairtrade and the new global labeling trend 
 
 The motivation behind Fairtrade is to build “a system of trade in which the partners seek 
deliberately to establish a more direct relationship between groups of producers and consumers in 
the two worlds and a greater understanding among consumers of the need of the producers for 
support for their independent development” (Barratt Brown, 1993: 156). Fairtrade is often called 
“alternative trade” because it aims to establish an alternate trade network to the commercial market. 
 Fairtrade in the world’s marketplace still has a small share compared to the conventional market. 
For example, Fairtrade coffee in Europe and the US accounts for only 1–2% of sales, with the 
notable exceptions of 20% in the United Kingdom and 6% in Switzerland in 2004 (Krier, 2005: 80; 
Transfair USA: Online). 
 The worldwide Fairtrade sales volume, however, continues to increase. For example, the volume 
increased by 40% in 2005 over the volume in 2004 (FLO: Online b). The rapid expansion can be 
partly attributed to the introduction of the labeling system in 1988(16). The idea has been widely 
accepted; in 1997, Fairtrade labeling organizations in several countries formed an umbrella 
organization called the Fairtrade Labeling Organization International (FLO)(17). The labeling system 
aims to increase Fairtrade sales by expanding the market to mainstream retailers such as 
supermarkets. It is effective in the standardization and systematization of Fairtrade certification. 
  For standardization through labeling, the FLO has several conditions(18). Of these, two affect 
small-scale coffee farmers. First, producers have to establish a democratic organization aiming at 
social, economic, and environmental development. This condition means that a general assembly 
must be established at cooperatives to direct and monitor democratic, participatory, and transparent 
organization, with the capacity to manage the administration of export and usage of Fairtrade 
premiums while promoting social development. Another condition concerns trade standards, a 
requirement directed at traders, rather than farmers. Trade standards incorporate long-term and 
stable relationships and require payment of a Fairtrade minimum price set by the FLO, including a 
US$0.05 per pound Fairtrade premium (see Table 3 for details). Organically grown coffee receives 
an additional premium of US$0.15 per pound. In case the market price is higher than the minimum 
price, the market price will be the minimum price, in addition to the Fairtrade premium. This price 
setting is attractive to producers. For example, US$1.15 per pound of the Fairtrade price applied to 
Ethiopian non-washed sundry coffee was 22% and 6% higher than unit prices of total national 
export results in 2004, 2005, respectively based on the data from National Bank of Ethiopia (2007). 
In this paper, I refer to Fairtrade through the FLO system simply as “Fairtrade” because most of 
Ethiopia’s Fairtrade coffee has been sold with FLO certification. 
 
2. Ethiopian coffee cooperatives and Fairtrade 
 
Fairtrade certificates are granted to primary cooperatives, not to unions. The number of certified 
cooperatives is still few, at only 24 of 165 primary cooperatives of the OCFCU, YCFCU, and 
SCFCU as of May 2006(19). In 2005, the shipment of Fairtrade coffee is assumed to be about 2% of 
the total national export(20). More primary cooperatives want to obtain FLO Fairtrade certificates 
because of the attractive price setting; however, the speed of admission by the FLO is slow. The 
main reasons for this include the general lack of administrative ability of the candidate cooperatives 
themselves, as well as the FLO’s unwillingness to issue too many certificates due to the limited 
market for Fairtrade products(21). 
 
IV. Organic Coffee: Another Premium Type of Coffee 
 
Organic coffee is another premium type of coffee.  Ethiopian organic coffee 
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also enjoys premium prices. According to data from the YCFCU, organic coffee 
has recently received a 19% higher premium over conventional coffee (Table 
4). 
The market size for organic coffee is also small, occupying only around 1% of the total market 
similar to the Fairtrade market(22). Organic coffee is sold not only through conventional routes, but 
also through Fairtrade. Consumers who choose Fairtrade coffee often prefer organic coffee to 
regular coffee, although the concepts underlying the production of organic coffee, which are 
consciousness of environmental conservation and health, are different from those underlying 
Fairtrade (Barratt Brown, 1993; Furusawa, 2004). 
The export volume of Ethiopian organic coffee is the second largest in the world next to that of 
Peru. In 2005, Ethiopia shipped about 9,000 tons, which was 19% of the world organic coffee 
export and 6% of the total Ethiopian coffee export volume (ICO: Online a; ICO: Online e). The 
reason for this high amount could be attributed to the low cost of organic coffee production; most 
of Ethiopian coffee is practically organic, and only a fee for the organic certificate is required. For 
organic certification, there are few restrictions for applicants. Either individuals or organizations 
can apply for the certificate because the certification requires agronomic conditions, rather than 
social, in contrast to Fairtrade. 
 
ACTIVITIES OF THE YIRGACHEFFE COOPERATIVE UNION AND ITS PRIMARY 
COOPERATIVES 
 
I. Basic Facts Concerning the Yirgacheffe Farmers Cooperative Union (YCFCU) and its Primary 
Cooperatives 
 
The Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union (YCFCU) was established in June 2002 and 
was the third coffee union to appear after the Oromiya Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 
(OCFCU) and Sidama Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union (SCFCU). Its office is located in Addis 
Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The YCFCU consists of 22 primary cooperatives with a membership 
of 43,794 coffee producers in the Gedeo Zone, SNNPR. Out of the 22 primary cooperatives, five 
have been Fairtrade certified, including two cooperatives that are also organic certified; and nine 
have been certified as organic coffee producers, but lack Fairtrade certification. The rate of 
membership of coffee producers in primary cooperatives is estimated at around 40%(23). Female 
members account for only 6.5% of the total membership, which is disproportionately low compared 
to the number of female landholders, who make up 20%(24) of all farmers in the Gedeo Zone (Central 
Agricultural Census Commission, 2003a: 68). 
The number of active members is, however, much fewer than the official number of members. 
This is apparent because there have only been 7,379 beneficiaries of dividends, which accounts for 
only 17% of the total membership of the YCFCU (see Table 5 for details)(25). The dividends to 
farmers are decided based on their volume sold to cooperatives. In 2005, the beneficiaries received 
an average of 128 Birr as dividends, ranging from 0.15 Birr to 7,278 Birr (US$1=8.70 Birr as of 
October 2006). The double-certified cooperatives enjoyed a high proportion of beneficiaries (i.e., 
active members), at 32–53% of cooperative members, whereas single-certified Fairtrade 
cooperatives were at 30%. 
 
II. The Realities of the Coffee Cooperative Marketing Channel 
 
Although the basic rule is that primary cooperatives sell coffee to unions, the 
majority of volume purchased from primary cooperatives did not go to unions 
because of the reasons explained in the previous section. The YCFCU purchased 1,036 tons, 
comprising 13% of the coffee purchased by primary cooperatives (7,744 tons)(26) in the fiscal year 
2004/05. This means that 87% of coffee purchased by primary cooperatives was sold through the 
auction route instead of the union route. The union mainly purchases coffee from Fairtrade and 
organic coop- eratives. In the fiscal year 2004/05, 93% of coffee purchased by the union was 
Fairtrade or organic; however, even Fairtrade and organic certified cooperatives could not sell all of 
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their coffee to the union. Only 18% of the volume gathered by these certified cooperatives was 
exported by the union during that fiscal year (see Tables 4 and 5 for details).  
Although the amounts of Fairtrade and organic coffee are not large compared to the total 
production volume in the Gedeo Zone, the union obtains the premium price of Fairtrade and 
organic coffee for 16% to 24% higher than New York price (Table 4). The premium is higher for 
double-certified coffee (Fairtrade and organic) than it is for single-certified coffee. The union also 
keeps the price of conventional coffee equivalent to the price established at the New York Stock 
Exchange. With these premium prices, the union has benefited the certified primary cooperatives. 
The average dividends per member tend to be higher for certified cooperatives than they are for 
other cooperatives, with an exception(27) (Table 5). 
The other primary cooperatives generally manage to sell their coffee by themselves through the 
conventional route. The relative independence of primary cooperatives from the unions is evident 
from data on profits. Even cooperatives without certification have secured profits. Based on data 
from the Gedeo Zone Cooperative Promotion Bureau, all of the cooperatives except one made a 
profit in the fiscal year of 2004/05(28). Whereas the unions made a profit of 1,259,783 Birr, the total 
profit of primary cooperatives was 5,422,252 Birr in 2004/05(29). Only 16% of the primary 
cooperatives’ profits came from the union in case the union provided 70% of the net profit of the 
union. 
 
III. Limitations of the Union and Cooperatives 
 
The biggest problem of the unions and cooperatives is the shortage of funds with which to 
purchase coffee. They finance their transactions using credit from banks(30). In cases in which they 
are unable to repay the credit, they are not granted new credit. Some past purchase records of 
cooperatives show some years without any purchases because of their failure to repay the banks. 
Financial constraints limit the amount of coffee purchased. For example, until recently, primary 
cooperatives purchased only fresh cherry for washed coffee, not sundry cherry for non-washed 
coffee. 
The difficulty of market acquisition in the limited size of Fairtrade market is another constraint to 
the expansion of cooperative activities. As described above, the YCFCU does not sell the whole 
amount produced by Fairtrade and organic cooperatives. This is contrary to the other unions 
because they claimed that they needed more Fairtrade certification for its primary cooperatives to 
meet the demands for Fairtrade(31). This implies that there has already been some competition among 
the unions for the Fairtrade market; the YCFCU might have been struggling to get its share. 
In the next section, actual conditions affecting coffee farmers in the Gedeo Zone are examined. 
The main questions are: (1) who benefits from cooperatives; 
(2) what kinds of benefits are received; and (3) how do cooperative activities affect rural 
society.EFFECTS OF COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES ON COFFEE FARMERS IN GEDEO ZONE 
 
I. Research Area: Gedeo Zone 
 
The Gedeo Zone is located in the southeastern Ethiopian highlands, 360 km south of Addis 
Ababa (see Fig. 2). The altitude of the area ranges from 1,200 to 2,993 m (Nerzy et al., 2000: 3; 
Tadesse, 2002: 22). The zone covers 1,329 km2 and has a population of 820,944. The Gedeo Zone is 
Ethiopia’s one of the most densely populated zones, with a density of 618 persons/km2 (Central 
Statistical Agency, 2006). 
The Gedeo people are the ethnic majority in the Gedeo Zone, making up 81% of the population. 
Regarding religion, 43% of the population is Protestant, 25% practices the “traditional” religion, 
and 22% is Ethiopian Orthodox (Central Statistical Authority, 1996). 
Gedeo is the main production area for the Yirgacheffe and Sidama types of coffee, which are 
famous coffee types. Coffee shipments are the largest of all of the zones of the SNNPR and account 
for 10% of the total shipment volume to the inspection center at Addis Ababa( 3 2 ) . 
The average cultivated area of a landholder is small, on average occupying only 0.3 ha. Coffee 
takes the biggest proportion of the cultivated areas, at 34%, followed by enset, at 31%, which is the 
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main staple food of the Gedeo people(33) (Central Agricultural Census Commission, 2003a: 148). The 
exact areas under cultivation by crop, however, were hard to measure because of the mixed farming 
system of intercropping products such as enset, maize, and avocado in this area (see Photo 4-1 to 
4-3). 
 
II. Interviews with Farmers 
 
1. Basic facts 
The research was conducted in July 2006, when the 2005/06 coffee year (October to September) 
was almost complete. 24 farmers to be interviewed were randomly selected. Only 1 of the 24 
farmers was female, making the ratio of women among the interview subjects, at 4%, relatively 
lower than the actual ratio of female members of YCFCU at 6.5%. 
 
2. Members 
Interviews revealed that most of the cooperative members were the members of the previous 
service cooperatives because they were allowed to re-enter current cooperatives without making 
any additional payments. Members who joined the cooperative at the time of its establishment paid 
a lower entry fee than did latecomers. 
Of the 24 interviewees, 9 were not members of cooperatives. The characteristics of the 
nonmembers can be classified according to three types: children of members; those with no access 
to cooperatives; and those who could not renew membership after the decease of the household’s 
cooperative member, especially in households headed by females. 
The children of members claimed that they did not need to become independent members by 
paying the entry fee because they ship their coffee to cooperatives along with their fathers’ coffee. 
The average age of nonmembers in areas where cooperatives are active was much younger, at 28 
years old, than the average age of members, at 42 (Table 6). Resulting from the generational 
difference between members and nonmembers, the size of the landholdings(34) of nonmembers was 
smaller, and thus the amount of coffee production was also less than that of members. 
Farmers who have no access to cooperatives use private traders. They choose private traders who 
are located close to their production places, rather than distant cooperatives. Nonmembers, however, 
are satisfied with the prices offered by private traders because private traders offer prices equivalent 
to those offered by cooperatives. Thus, access to cooperatives seems to be affected by geographical 
location. The cooperative membership rate of Kochole woreda(35) is low, at 25%, because the woreda 
covers a wide area with a relatively small proportion of coffee producing area, at only 26% of the 
total land(36) (Table 7). 
The female coffee producer interviewed had lost her household’s membership because of the 
death of her husband. She had not asked for entry to the cooperative, and had not been asked to join 
the cooperative. This is only one example, due to the low interview coverage of women, but could 
indicate how female household heads are excluded from cooperative membership(37). 
 
3. Price 
There are two types of coffee after initial processing: sundry and washed. For sundry coffee, 
farmers dry coffee beans under the sun and traders or cooperatives dry them further and then 
decorticate them by machine. For washed coffee, farmers sell fresh coffee beans to traders or 
cooperatives immediately after harvesting them and then the traders and cooperatives soak coffee 
beans in water to ferment and remove their husks(38) (see Photo 4-4). In Ethiopia, the majority of 
coffee exported is the sundry type, at 73% of total export for the fiscal year 2005/06(39). The 
international price of washed coffee is usually higher than for sundry coffee because the washed 
method produces more homogenous quality, with fewer defective beans. In Ethiopia, for example, 
during the first quarter of fiscal year 2003/04, washed coffee was US$0.75, 34% higher than the 
US$0.56 per  pound for  sundry coffee  (Coffee  and Tea Authori ty,  2003:  8) . 
The price comparison between these two types of coffee beans is complicated because sundry 
and fresh beans differ in weight due to the drying process. According to FAO estimates (FAO: 
Online), sundry beans lose weight by 64% of fresh cherries; therefore in Yirgacheffe, farmers 
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suppose that 1 kg of dry beans is equivalent to 3 kg of fresh cherries. 
In general, the prices of sundry and fresh coffee cherries are either the same, or the price of 
sundry is higher than that of fresh cherries(40). One of the main reasons for this is that fresh cherries 
are usually sold by farmers who have immediate need for cash because the fresh cherries cannot be 
stored for a long time, whereas sundry beans can be stored by farmers for an entire year without 
serious declines in quality (Kodama, 2003: 173). 
During author’s research in Yirgacheffe, the price of fresh cherries was 1.6–4.6 Birr/kg and the 
converted price of dry beans was 1.4–2.6 Birr/kg in 2005/06. The price of dry beans was well 
below the price of fresh beans(41). Most of the farmers interviewed recognized that the price of fresh 
cherry has increased since the entry of cooperatives into the coffee market in 2000(42). They also 
realized that the price offered by private traders decreased when the cooperative did not buy coffee 
due to lack of funds. The prices offered by cooperatives and traders were often the same, although 
some of the traders added 0.1 Birr to the cooperatives’ price. Usually private traders would pay the 
money to farmers immediately, whereas cooperatives sometimes paid late, usually after a couple of 
weeks, when they had financial constraints. 
Despite the premium price and rapid payments of traders, cooperative members preferred to sell 
their coffee to cooperatives for dividends. Whereas dividends varied year by year, in general, 
farmers could expect 0.1–0.2 Birr/kg as dividends from April to September. 
The effects of cooperatives on price are not limited to Fairtrade cooperatives, but include non 
Fairtrade cooperatives. As mentioned above, the majority of the volume collected by cooperatives 
is sold at the auction center. Even if cooperatives used the conventional marketing channel, they 
could provide more profits to farmers than could traders due to dividends payments. 
It is difficult to conclude the reason why cooperatives offer higher prices than traders; this 
question requires more detailed long-term research. However, there are three possibilities. First, 
cooperatives could be more efficient than private traders. Second, farmers sell different qualities 
of coffee to cooperatives than to traders. In expectation of dividends, farmers tend to sell a better 
quality of coffee to cooperatives. Therefore, cooperatives’ coffee could receive a better score in 
auctions than traders’ coffee. One farmer claimed that he carefully selected coffee for his 
cooperative, whereas he did not care about the quality of coffee for private traders, and even put 
stones or leaves in bags of coffee for traders because his business with traders was not long-term 
and traders were usually only somewhat concerned about quality. Third, the high prices might be 
brought about simply by the upward international price trend. Their sustainability needs more 
examination over the long term because it is not known how cooperatives would manage in the 
case of a downturn of the international price of coffee.  
Of the 24 farmers interviewed, 22 sell more dry beans than fresh beans, despite the higher price 
of the latter. Cooperatives do not yet handle the sale of dry cherries due to the limits of funds and 
transportation. Other reasons of the higher ratio of dry beans might include income leveling and 
some speculation in the international coffee price. To secure a constant income throughout the year, 
farmers do not sell all of their coffee at one time. The Ministry of Agriculture also advises farmers 
to maintain a stock of coffee and not to spend all of their income from coffee at once(43). 
 
4. Cooperatives and farmers 
 
The basic procedures of the selection of management members of the cooperatives appear 
democratic. Members interviewed did not claim any unfairness and understood that the working 
members of the cooperatives are farmers or the children of farmers. They attended meetings and 
raised their hands indicating approval for the executive members. It is apparent, however, that the 
cooperatives are not actually operated by the farmers themselves. Most of the interviewees 
regarded the cooperatives in the same way that they viewed the service cooperatives of the previous 
regime. They often compared them in terms of service activities and coffee price. Interviews 
revealed that the cooperative is in fact a customer of coffee farmers, rather than “their” 
organization. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Coffee cooperatives have brought benefits to coffee farmers by providing a new marketing 
channel. The dividends are appreciated by farmers and have encouraged farmers to improve the 
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quality of their coffee. Although the actual volume purchased by cooperatives is limited due to 
financial constraints, the existence of cooperatives in the coffee market has improved the 
purchasing price offered by private traders because of competition with the cooperatives. 
The Fairtrade option has made cooperative activities more attractive to farmers in terms of 
pricing. However, the market is limited and the FLO qualification is too strict for all of the primary 
cooperatives in Ethiopia to satisfy all of the conditions. With the successful progress of the first 
three coffee unions, more cooperatives and more unions have been established. The first three 
unions received various types of support from the government and international aid agencies such 
as USAID. Latecomers may not enjoy such support. Considering their underdeveloped 
management skills, the expansion of cooperative activities may not proceed as well as of the first 
three unions. Competition among unions has begun, in addition to competition with private traders. 
It is too early to evaluate the activities of coffee cooperatives because they began only in 1999, 
but at this point, the effects of the cooperatives appear positive for farmers, especially in terms of 
price. Improving the management capabilities and accounting skills of cooperatives is critical for 
the development and sustainability of cooperative activities. 
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NOTES 
 
(1) The policy of economic liberalization was instituted in 1990 by the previous Derg regime as “the 1990 
Economic Reform Program.” However, the regime collapsed in 1991 before the policy had significant 
effects. 
(2) The averages of the export values for fiscal years 1995/96 and 2004/05 are based on figures from the 
National Bank of Ethiopia (2005). The Ethiopian fiscal year runs from 8 July to 7 July. 
(3) The official name of the exchange market is The Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE). The CSCE 
handles the Arabica type of coffee. Robusta coffee is handled by the London International Financial 
Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) in London. 
(4) Strictly speaking, private traders can participate in the Fairtrade business as long as they satisfy certain 
conditions. See the following section for details of Fairtrade. 
(5) I use the name “Derg” for the previous government from 1974 to 1991 because although the government 
professed its aim to build a socialist state, it actually remained a military state during the entire regime. 
Derg was the Amharic name (originally meaning “committee” or “Council”) of the Coordinating 
Committee of the Armed Force, Police and Territorial Army (Marcus, 1994: 187; Ofcansky & Berry, 
1993: 53). 
(6) Kodama (2003) mentioned the decline of the Ethiopia Coffee Purchase and Sales Enterprise (ECPSE), and 
not specifically the service cooperatives (SCs). Considering the role of service cooperatives during the 
previous regime, however, the SCs can be identified as agents of the state marketing corporations in 
important aspects (Samia, 1989). 
(7) Prior to No. 147/1998, Proclamation No. 85/1994 was issued in 1994 with the title of “Agricultural 
Cooperative Societies Proclamation” under the transitional government of Ethiopia, which was the 
predecessor of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It was replaced by No. 147/1998, issued by 
the Federal government. 
(8)  This was also permitted by No. 85/1994. 
(9) The available information concerning unions is from the Oromiya, Yirgacheffe and Sidama Coffee 
Farmers Cooperative Unions. It does not include the remaining three  because they were newly 
established and I did not have access to their information. 
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(10) This kind of swindle was also reported in cases between exporters and private traders  
    (Kodama, 2003) 
(11) Based on interviews with the Southern Cooperative Promotion Bureau on July 19 and VOCA-Ethiopia 
on July 24, 2006. 
(12) According to an interview with the Federal Cooperative Commission on July 24, 2006, the decision is 
made by unions, not by cooperatives. 
(13) The share will be used for “the capital which enables the society to expand its work activities” (No. 
147/1998). 
(14) Proclamation No. 402/2004 (“Cooperative Societies [Amendment] Proclamation”) is the amendment of 
No. 147/1998. 
(15) Based on the author’s interviews with YCFCU on July 18 and OCFCU, VOCA-Ethiopia, and the Federal 
Cooperative Commission on July 24, 2006. 
(16) The Fairtrade labeling system was introduced in the Netherlands in 1988. 
(17) There are criticisms to the labeling approach in terms of the original concept of Fairtrade because the 
standardized method enables multinational enterprises to be certified as Fairtrade organizations. This 
situation is against the original concept of Fairtrade, which was to bring alternative trading channels to 
the conventional marketplace (Hotta, 2006; Tsujimura, 2006). 
(18) For the detailed conditions, see FLO: Online c. 
(19) Data are from the OCFCU, YCFCU, and SCFCU. According to the FLO, only these three unions had 
received the FLO certificate as of May 2006 (FLO: Online d.). 
(20) Based on unpublished data from the Oromiya, and Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Unions, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The data of the Sidama Farmers Cooperative Unions was not available. 
(21) Based on the author’s interview with the SCFCU on 18 July and VOCA-Ethiopia on July, 24 2006. 
(22) The export volume share of organic coffee was 0.9% in 2005, calculated by author based on total export 
volume data and organic coffee of the member countries of the International Coffee Organization 
(ICO: Online a; ICO: Online e). Baffes et al. (2004: 307) estimated that organic coffee had a 
consumption share of 0.6% in 2002/2003, with 1.2–2.8% in some European countries, 1.1% in the U.S., 
and 0.5% in Japan. 
(23) Based on the comparison between the number of memberships of the YCFCU and the coffee land holders 
by woreda from the Central Agricultural Census Commission (2003b). 
(24) This includes all landholders of coffee and noncoffee production. 
(25) According to the interview with YCFCU on July 18, 2006, the YCFCU currently focuses on the 
dividends to the coffee volume contributors, rather than the shareholders, because they want to 
encourage coffee farmers to sell coffee to cooperatives. 
(26) The 7,744 tons of coffee purchased by the primary cooperatives in 2004/05 was assumed to comprise 
23% of the total shipment out of the Gedeo Zone, based on unpublished data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
(27) One cooperative (Chichu) without any certificates enjoyed high dividends. However, it must be 
considered that its membership ratio was much lower, at 6% than average ratio at 17%. The cooperative 
might buy coffee more selectively. 
(28) The reason of the loss for the cooperative is not clear. 
(29) Based on the mimeo of the Gedeo Zone Cooperative Promotion Bureau. The data shows the different 
figures between the sum of net profits of primary cooperatives and the net profits of primary cooperative 
total. This paper used the former. 
(30) According to the interview with VOCA-Ethiopia and a USAID press release (USAID Ethiopia. Online), 
the financial problem has been mitigated since the USAID Development Credit Authority (DCA) started 
the Long Guarantee Scheme for coffee in 2000. The scheme aims to finance the purchasing fund of 
banks without the need for collateral. The DCA guarantees 50% of loans to leverage their funds up to 25 
times. For details, see Dorsey and Tesfaye (2005). 
(31) Based on the author’s interviews with SCFCU on July 18, 2006 and OCFCU on July 24, 2006. 
(32) Based on data from fiscal years 2004/05 and 2005/06 from the Ministry of Agriculture. The data does not 
include the shipment volume to the inspection center at Dire Dawa. 
(33) For enset, see Tsedeke et al. (1996). 
(34) The land is usually divided for inheritance among sons (Ayalew et al., 1996). Therefore the land of the 
son’s generation is typically much smaller than that of the father’s generation. 
(35) The administrative divisions have four levels, namely region, zone, woreda, and qebele, in order of 
decreasing size. 
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(36) Another geographical reason might be the difficulty of gathering members in Kochole woreda because 
the coffee production areas are separated by noncoffee production areas (USAID & DPPA/B: Online). 
(37) There is a possibility for female-headed households to use the son’s membership. 
(38) In Ethiopia, coffee farmers do not process coffee by themselves except to dry it under the sun. This is 
likely because farmers lack the capital to do so, and supposedly because of a directive from the Ministry 
of Agriculture to maintain export quality. 
(39) Based on unpublished data from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
(40) Based on the author’s survey in the Oromiya Region in 2002. The research by Ayalew et al. (1996: 7) 
also mentioned the price of fresh and dry beans in the Gedeo Zone before the union was established. The 
converted price of the dry beans (2.9 Birr/kg) was higher than the price of fresh beans (2 Birr/kg) in their 
research area, Adado, in Gedeo Zone. 
(41) The sales season for fresh beans is from October to December and the season for dry beans is after 
January. The trend in the international coffee price for Natural Arabicas, which includes Ethiopian coffee, 
was upward from $0.94 US/lb in October 2005 to $1.09 US/lb in February 2006), an increase of 16% 
(ICO: Online d). Therefore, the higher price of fresh beans did not result from the international price 
decrease during the dry bean season. 
(42) Considering the downward trend in the international price of coffee in 1998–2001 and the upward trend 
after 2002, it is difficult to conclude that the price increase was brought about solely by the cooperatives 
in the long term. 
(43) Based on an interview with a farmer on July 21, 2006. 
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able 1. Ethiopia: Rural Organization in the Derg  regime (1988/89)
Organization No.
Household Members
 (Million)
# of PAs Covered
Peasant Associations 20,455 6 -
Producers' Cooperatives 3,732 0 -
Service Cooperatives 4,052 5 17,785
Source: Various Ministry of Agriculture publications 1987-89, quoted by Dessalegn, 1994a:248.
 
 
 
 T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
able 2. Ethiopia Coffee  Farmers Cooperative Unions
      # of the Primary Coops
Fair Trade
Certificate
(FLO*1）
Organic
Certificate
（BCS*2）
Oromiya Coffee Farmers Cooperative
Union (OCFCU)
1999 101 11 35 74,725
Oromiya
R egion
Sidama Coffee Farmers  Cooperative
Union (SCFC U)
2001 42 8 25 86,675
Sidama Zone,
SNNPR
Yirgacheffe Coffee Far mers  Cooperative
Union (YCFCU)
2002 22 5 12 43,794
Gedeo Zone,
SNNPR
Kaffa Forest Coffee Farmers  Producers Cooperative
Union (KFCFPCU)
2004 26  NA  NA 6,632
Kaffa Zone,
SNNPR
Tepi Coffee Farmers
C ooperative Union NA*
3  NA  NA  NA  NA
Tepi Zone,
SNNPR
B ench Maji Fores t Coff ee Producers
Farmers ' Cooperative Union NA*
3 NA  NA  NA  NA
Benchi-Maji
Zone, SNNPR
Source: OCFC U: "Profile of Oromia Coffee Far mers  Cooperative Union/OCFCU LTD", unpublished.
            YCFC U: Based on the YCFCU' s leaflet.
            SCFCU: Based on the SCFCU's  leaflet.
            KFSFPCU: Based on the KFCFCU's  leaflet.
            The other Unions ' information was  based on the author's  interview with Federal Cooperative Commission and VOC A-Ethiopia.
Note: *1 Fair  Trade Organization.
         *2 BCS ÖKO-GARANTIE GMBH.
         *3 After 2005, but the exact data are not available.
Established
Year
#  of
Member ship
AreaName
 Table3. FLO: Fairtrade Minimum Price and Premium 
Fairtrade Premium
Conventional and
Organic
Central America,
Mexico, Africa,
Asia
South America,
Caribbean Area
Central America,
Mexico, Africa,
Asia
South America,
Caribbean Area
All regions
Washed Arabica 121 119 136 134 5
Non-Washed Arabica 115 115 130 130 5
Washed Robusta 105 105 120 120 5
Non-Washed Robusta 101 101 116 116 5
Source:  FLO. Online a. http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/Coffee_SF_Dec_05_EN.pdf
(accessed on February 5, 2007).
Conventional Organic
             Fairtrade Minimum Price (US￠/lb)
Type of Coffee
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able 4. Purchased Coffee by the Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union (By type, 2004/05)
Tons % of total FOB Price*1 New York C
Addis Ababa
Auction Price
($/lb, average) ($/lb, average) ($/lb, average)*1*2
Fair trade 238 23 1.318
Organic &  Fairtrade 581 56 1.412
Organic 142 14 1.388
Conventional 62 6 1.168 1.14 1.085
Total 1036*3 100 1.396
Source:  Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union 2005. Yirgacheffe Coffee Farmers Cooperative
            Union 1995–1997 3-Year Activities Major Achievement  (in Amharic). Unpublished, Addis Ababa.
Note:  *1 The price is average of Sidamo type and Yirgacheffe coffee type.
　　　　*2　The data calculated based on $1=8.6518 Birr. National Bank of Ethiopia, 2007
          *3  The total number was quoted from the source, instead of the sum of the above numbers.
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Table 5. The D
ata by the Prim
ary C
ooperatives of the Yirgcheffe C
offee Farm
ers C
ooperative U
nions
Total
m
ax.
m
in.
ave.
Y
irga C
heffe
H
afursa
○
○
1,086
571
53
618
85
111,179
2,841
0.70
195
Y
irga C
heffe
K
onga
○
○
2,220
1,174
53
826
79
240,000
2,496
3.30
204
K
ochore
H
am
a
○
○
1,564
506
32
574
41
71,012
3,946
2.10
140
W
onago
Finchew
a
○
1,259
372
30
452
18
56,053
3,749
0.30
151
W
onago
H
ase H
aro
○
1,851
531
29
444
24
63,654
1,829
1.80
120
W
onago
B
elekara
○
983
      N
A
    N
A
363
19
31,625
4,354
1.70
    N
A
W
onago
K
ello
○
1,402
      N
A
    N
A
217
11
13,717
1,056
1.30
    N
A
W
onago
A
ddis K
etem
a
○
1,808
      N
A
    N
A
249
16
        N
A
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
Y
irga C
heffe
Q
oqe
○
1,548
688
44
511
40
71,538
907
0.90
104
Y
irga C
heffe
Edido
○
2,298
      N
A
    N
A
366
26
        N
A
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
Y
irga C
heffe
H
aru
○
1,635
243
15
220
14
15,425
1,019
1.70
63
K
ochore
Sigiga
○
3,627
      N
A
    N
A
220
10
        N
A
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
K
ochore
B
eloya
○
2,083
298
14
310
25
61,158
3,529
1.65
205
B
ule
A
dado*
2
○
2,426
     N
A
    N
A
       N
A
N
A
        N
A
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
W
onago
R
esa
2,860
615
22
411
15
36,702
1,353
0.80
60
W
onago
Tum
itcha
1,780
316
18
421
27
25,552
872
0.35
81
W
onago
M
ichle
2,188
411
19
281
17
27,122
2,386
0.70
66
W
onago
D
am
a
2,499
610
24
285
24
42,367
7,251
1.05
69
W
onago
C
hichu
2,675
172
6
303
26
28,541
7,278
0.90
166
Y
irga C
heffe
A
ram
o
3,325
553
17
366
39
40,150
3,116
0.15
73
Y
irga C
heffe
D
um
erso
1,849
319
17
306
23
11,200
411
0.15
35
Special W
oreda
A
m
aro K
ele*
2
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
       N
A
N
A
        N
A
     N
A
     N
A
    N
A
Total 
42,966
7,379
17
7,744
23
946,994
7,278
0.15
128
Source:  G
edeo Zone C
ooperative Prom
otion B
ureau unpublished data, Y
C
FC
U
's leaflet
         *
2  R
ecent entry. The A
m
raro K
ele is categorized as the special woreda
and does not belong to any zone.
N
ote: *
1  It w
as calculated based on the actual shipm
ent in G
edeo Zone in 2004/05 from
 M
inistry of A
griculture (no woreda
 level), and potential production by
woreda
from
the
Y
C
FC
U
's
leaflet.
C
ooperative
O
rganic
Fairtrade
M
em
ber-
ships
(2005)
B
enefi-
ciaries
(2005)
%
 of
m
em
ber-
ships
  D
ividend(B
irr)-profit from
 2004
Purchased
V
olum
e by
coop from
farm
ers
(2004, tons)
W
oreda
%
 of
production*
1
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able 6. Average Profile of  Farmers Interviewed in Gedeo Zone.
(n) Age
Education
(grade)
Area*１
(ha)
Coffee
Production*2
(kg)
Cooperative Area
    Member 15 42 6.3 1.70 1,163
    Non-Member 5 28 6.4 0.52 452
Non-Cooperative  Area
    Non-Member*3 3 48 4.7 2.50 3,168
Source: Field survey by author
te  *１ The Production area is different from the census data at 0.3 ha (Central Agricultural Census
         Commision 2003a). This is likely due to the tendency of lower statement for the official research
         and the possibility to include all the land of the family even of the independent sons for the
         author's research.
         *2 Converted volume based on the weight difference between fresh and dry beans from FAO
         estimate (FAO. Online. http://www.coffee-ota.org/3_7_property.asp (accessed on Februry 5,
         2007)).
         *3 One out of four farmers was exclueded, because his data seemed to be outlier with age of
         84 and coffee production of 15,600 kg.
.
Table 7. The Coffee Cooperatigves Membership Ratio by Woreda  in Gedeo Zone*.
woreda
Total Area
(ha)
Coffee Production
Area (ha)
Number of
cooperatives
Memberships
(2005)
% of  coffee
land holders
Yirga Cheffe 7,596 3,153 7 13,961 52
Wonago 8,756 4,500 10 19,305 49
Bule 9,099 556 1 2,426 47
Kochore 22,254 5,836 3 7,274 25
Total 47,705 14,045 21 42,966 43
Note:  * YCFCU has a cooperatives located in the special woreda  which does not belong to any zone. It is
not included in this table since the cooperative has just started the activity.
Source:  Gedeo Zone Cooperative Promotion Bureau unpublished data, Central Agricultural Census
Commission, 2003a.
                                       
 
Fig 1. Ethiopia Coffee Marketing Route. 
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